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Damages for Mental Suffering in
Discrimination Cases
John E. Duda*
A NTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION enacted by Congress and by
legislatures of various states reflects a general recognition
of the idea that discrimination by reason of race is a wrong for
which there should be both a prohibition and a remedy. Save for
those former slave states in which complete separation of the
races remains preserved by custom and law, most state legisla-
tures have enacted statutes attacking various forms of racial dis-
crimination.' While recent legislative action by a few states has
provided effective remedies, statutory prohibitions against racial
discrimination have been available since the latter 1800's. These
early state pronouncements were a result of the failure of the
first post-Civil War federal civil rights act2 to withstand consti-
tutional scrutiny by the United States Supreme Court.3 Some of
the earliest state legislation prohibits racial discrimination in
public accommodations, hospitals, recreational facilities, jury
venire selection, voting, and by insurance companies. For the
most part, the first public accommodations laws have been at-
tacked as being ineffective for want of an adequate remedy.
These statutes provided for criminal penalties or limited punitive
damage awards, both of which often operated as a license for the
violator to continue discriminating.4 Some state laws enacted
within the last decade have expanded the prohibition to housing,
education, and employment, and have strengthened the effect of
pre-existing prohibitions against discrimination in places of pub-
lic accommodations. 5 A fresh approach has been to create a gov-
ernment agency authorized to order a discriminator to cease and
*Of the Cleveland Bar; formerly Asst. Atty. Genl. of Ohio, and Counsel to
the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.
1 For citations to laws of all jurisdictions see Greenberg, Race Relations and
American Law, 275-79 (1959); also, State Laws and Agencies for Civil
Rights, Gov. Comm. on Human Rights (Wis., 1960).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stats. 335, Vol. 3 (1875).
3 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883).
4 See Van Alstyne, A Critique of the Ohio Public Accommodations Law,
22 Ohio St. L. J. 201 (1961); also see, Note, 12 Cinc. L. Rev. 60 (1938); and
See, Goostree, The Iowa Civil Rights Statute-A Problem of Enforcement,
37 Iowa L. Rev. 242 (1952).
5 See n. 1, supra.
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desist from his unlawful discriminatory practice. 6 These agencies
seem to be effective in eliminating discrimination in those cases
where valid complaints are filed.7
Federal legislation attacks racial discrimination in employ-
ment, public accommodations, voting, and transportation.8 In
addition, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution is a traditional basis for
a cause of action for injunctive relief against discriminatory state
agencies. 9 Its effect on individual discrimination has not yet been
settled by the courts.10
The earlier state laws contemplate punitive remedies. The
more recent statutory schemes, as well as the federal constitu-
tional pronouncements, are designed to provide injunctive relief.
Generally, they do not anticipate, as the thrust of their remedy,
compensating the victim of unlawful discrimination for his injury.
There are two notable exceptions: (1) The authority granted to
some state civil rights agencies to order dollar awards for back
pay in addition to an order to hire, reinstate, or upgrade an em-
ployee in employment discrimination cases;" and (2) California's
(Unruh) Civil Rights Act which creates liability for ". . . actual
damages, and two hundred fifty dollars in addition thereto .... ,, 12
This article explores the legal basis for an award of damages
for mental suffering caused by unlawful racial discrimination. It
necessarily includes religious and nationality discrimination,
since these three areas are intertwined in the law. For the most
part, the legal principles are applicable alike to all three forms of
discrimination. Mental suffering is treated as an element of com-
pensatory damages on the theory that the purpose of such an
award is to compensate the claimant for his loss and not neces-
6 E.g.; Ohio Civil Rights Act, Secs. 4112.01 to 4112.99, Ohio Rev. Code (as
amended 1965).
7 See Annual Reports of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission for the years
1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964.
8 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. Secs. 1981-2000a (1964).
9 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); also see, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948).
10 See Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Lumbard v. State of Louisi-
ana, 83 S. Ct. 1122 (1963); followed in Gegner v. Graham, 1 Ohio App. 2d
442 (1964), 205 N.E. 69 (1964); dismissed for mootness: 1 Ohio St. 2d. 108,
205 N.E. 2d 72 (1965).
11 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 4112.05 (G).
12 Cal. Civil Code, Sec. 51 (as amended 1961).
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DAMAGES FOR DISCRIMINATION
sarily to penalize the discriminator. Punishment enters the anal-
ysis only to the extent that the prevailing legal rules governing
damage awards for mental suffering are different in cases involv-
ing intentional conduct from those applicable to negligence.
First let us examine the idea of compensation for loss in civil
rights cases generally. Compensatory damage awards in discrim-
ination cases are relatively rare. The law has given little atten-
tion to the idea that a person should be compensated for his in-
jury or loss caused by a discriminator's unlawful conduct. There
are perhaps several reasons for the thin precedent to support
compensatory awards in civil rights cases. First, there are other
available statutory remedies. 13 The extent to which these rem-
edies are or have been inadequate reflects the degree of the
white majority's willingness both to recognize the actuality of
racial discrimination, and the extent of the white majority's de-
sire to eliminate it. Second, until the recent press for equality
by organized civil rights groups and equally recent publications
by Negro writers, there has been little public attention given to
the injury to the individual caused by racial discrimination.
Third, racial discrimination was accepted as a matter of course-
as a custom of the community-the results of which either did
not occur to the white man, did not outrage him, or actually
pleased him. Fourth, and perhaps most significant, Negroes sim-
ply have not made claims for compensation. They are aware,
after all, that the merit of their claims invariably is decided by
a white judge and a white jury. Undoubtedly, there are other
factors which contribute to the absence of litigation. For our
purposes, it is sufficient to recognize that claims for, and awards
of, compensatory damages are not common.
Whether anti-discrimination legislation can be the basis of
a cause of action for compensatory damages has become a matter
of recent interest for the courts. In Bachrach v. 1001 Tenants
Corporation,14 a recent case, a Jewish claimant sued a cooperative
apartment corporation for compensatory damages. He claimed
that the defendant refused to allow him to acquire an interest in
an apartment solely because of his religion. Bachrach relied on
a New York City ordinance' which provides for an administra-
tive and judicial remedy upon the initiative of the named admin-
13 Supra, n. 1.
14 41 Misc. 2d 512, 245 N.Y.S. 2d 912 (1963).
15 New York City Administrative Code, Secs. D1-1.O to D1-4.0.
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1966
15 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
istrative agency. The ordinance prohibits the denial of accom-
modations to any person because of his race, color, religion, na-
tional origin or ancestry. The defendant moved to dismiss on the
ground that the ordinance provides for no private or individual
remedy in the form of an action for damages. The trial court
denied the motion and held that the defendant's willful denial
of consent to the plaintiff's purchase of an apartment was action-
able at law for damages, that the available administrative remedy
is not exclusive, and that the action sounds in prima facie tort.
The court said that while the claim was novel, that alone did not
warrant dismissal. The trial court viewed the cause as one of
prima facie tort for injury due to the infliction of intentional
harm, resulting in damages, without excuse or justification. On
appeal, the appellate division reversed the trial court and dis-
missed the complaint.16 It held that the administrative remedy
is exclusive and that Bachrach had no private action for damages.
The highest appeals court affirmed the appellate division's deci-
sion without opinion. 17
On the other hand, in Amos v. Prom, Inc.'s the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Iowa assumed that an
action for damages is available to a victim of discriminatory con-
duct which violates the Iowa Civil Rights Act.19 A Negro citizen
of Iowa brought an action in the federal court for $3,000.00 com-
pensatory and $7,000.00 punitive damages against a Delaware
corporation engaged in operating a dance hall in Clear Lake,
Iowa. She claimed that the defendant willfully and maliciously
refused to admit her to its ballroom solely because of her race.
The Iowa statute is clearly criminal in character. It prohibits
racial discrimination in places of public accommodation, makes
violation a misdemeanor, and imposes a fine. No other remedy is
provided for by the Act. Prom, Inc. moved to dismiss on the
ground that under the Iowa law regarding compensatory and
exemplary damages, it would be legally impossible for Miss Amos
to recover damages in excess of $3,000.00; therefore, the amount
of the damage claim could not meet the federal court's jurisdic-
tional minimum then in effect.20 The court overruled defendant's
16 21 AD. 2d 622, 249 N.Y.S. 2d 855 (1964).
17 15 N.Y. 2d 718, 256 N.Y.S. 2d 929 (1965).
18 115 F. Supp. 127 (D.C. Iowa, 1953).
19 Iowa Civil Rights Act, Sec. 735.1; Code of Iowa 1950, Vol. 55, I.C.A.
20 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332 (1953).
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motion to dismiss after coming to the conclusion that it was not
a legal certainty that Miss Amos could not receive an award in
excess of the jurisdictional requirement. After taking as true the
allegation that defendant's action was malicious, willful, illegal,
and based solely on her race with no other justification, the court
held that the defendant, without justification, intentionally com-
mitted an illegal act to plaintiff's injury. Even though the court
did not explicitly label the action as one in "prima facie tort," it
recognized that the claim was for an intentional wrong which
caused an injury, an analysis not far from that of the trial court
in the Bachrach case.
We must take notice, however, that the Iowa statute was
criminal in character. The New York City ordinance was
administrative. It did not declare racial discrimination a crime.
While this distinction might be a reason for attaching an action
at law for damages to one and not the other, it appears that
it is a distinction without merit. Both acts prohibit a wrong;
both declare discrimination evil; both recognize the harm done
by discrimination; yet both fail to provide for compensation to
an injured victim. Only the statutory schemes for solution differ.
New York City's administrative mechanism is designed to elimi-
nate the evil by injunction rather than merely to punish the
wrongdoer. The Iowa Public Accommodation Act seeks only
punishment. But forced compliance or punishment do not make
a victim whole. Injunctive and punitive anti-discrimination legis-
lation should not infringe upon the law's traditional objective of
attempting to make whole a victim of intentionally inflicted in-
jury. An action for damages should be available to any person
injured by the conduct of an intentional wrongdoer who acts
without justification. Where there is a statute that provides a
means either to end the harm or to punish the wrongdoer, its
remedy should not be exclusive. If Mr. Bachrach was caused to
purchase an apartment at a price higher than the price of the one
that he was denied by 1001 Tenants because of his religion, the
defendant should be liable for this loss. This injury is no less
real than similar injuries in other tort and contract actions. Fur-
thermore, once the injury is inflicted, the discriminator's com-
pliance with the statute does not compensate his victim for past
harm. In the Bachrach case, for example, the sale of the apart-
ment to Mr. Bachrach after administrative or court order cannot
compensate him for loss due to a difference in rent during liti-
gation. Nor will it make him financially whole should he be un-
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1966
15 CLEV-MAR L. R. (1)
able to dispose of the alternative apartment that he was caused
to buy due to defendant's conduct.
As claimants begin to file actions for damages due to dis-
crimination, the courts will be required to look more realistically
at the basis for this cause of action. Where statutes explicitly
state that their remedies are exclusive, the courts will have little
alternative but to deny a remedy at law. Such an exclusionary
clause operates to take away a cause of action at law for dam-
ages and ought to be carefully scrutinized as to its effect when
offered to legislatures for enactment. In the absence of such a
legislative declaration, courts should be attentive to the law's
traditional purpose of attempting to make the victim whole. In
some cases the conduct of a discriminator might be so outrageous
to society and injurious to the claimant that the latter's action
will stand apart from a statutory prohibition, on traditional tort
law alone. Principles applicable to prima facie tort, the inten-
tional infliction of harm resulting in damage without excuse or
justification, 2 should be explored by the courts as civil rights
damage cases come before them.
After once having decided that persons discriminated against
because of their race have a cause of action for damages, courts
will face an equally challenging problem of delineating those in-
juries suffered by the claimants which are compensable. Mental
suffering as an item of compensatory damages will be among the
first to be scrutinized. In public accommodations cases, it will
probably be the only injury complained of. The singular Negro
mother and child turned away at a midtown restaurant, the Ne-
gro gentleman refused a haircut by a local barber, the Negro boy
and girl refused admission to a movie theatre, will have little
compensable injury beyond their insult, humiliation, and mental
anguish. In employment, housing, and education cases, other ele-
ments can be anticipated. Loss of income due to an inability to
obtain a job, back pay, differences in purchase price of real estate
due to a refusal to sell the originally desired property, loss of
income due to inadequate education or refusal to educate, are
some other possibilities. Here, too, mental suffering will be con-
templated as an added element of damages. In most cases, claims
for emotional distress, mental anguish, insult, outrage, and injury
to pride or reputation, as kinds of mental suffering, are consider-
ations in determining a Negro's injury. In order to answer
whether or not courts will allow compensation for mental suffer-
21 Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 146 N.Y.S. 2d 808 (1955).
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ing in civil rights cases, we must first direct our attention to the
current status of the law as it relates to compensation for mental
suffering.
A sharp distinction between mental suffering inflicted by in-
tentional misconduct and that caused by negligence is necessary.
In negligence cases, the courts agree that mental disturbance ac-
companied by physical impact is compensable. At present there
is a dispute among the authorities as to whether or not recovery
for mental suffering in the absence of physical impact will be
compensated. The so-called impact rule has been repudiated by
the majority view in favor of the rule allowing mental suffering
resulting in physical harm even where there is no contempora-
neous impact. However, some courts jealously hold on to the old
"impact rule." Where there is mental disturbance as the only
result of negligence, the courts generally agree that there is no
recovery. Emotional fright in the absence of resultant physical
harm is believed to be easily feigned and usually so trivial that
the law will not protect against mere negligence. But in a 1964
case New York said that the mental suffering caused to a mother
by seeing her child struck by a car is actionable.2," Where the
mental suffering is intentionally inflicted, the law is more lib-
eral.2
2
Extreme and intentionally inflicted mental suffering is com-
pensable in the absence of resultant physical harm. There are
several requirements. First, the act must be intentional or will-
ful. Second, the mental suffering must be extreme. With only a
few exceptions, insult and indignity is not enough. 23 Third, the
conduct must exceed that which is considered decent by the com-
munity. It must be "outrageous." 24 While these tests are not
easily met, there is a growing list of incidents that have come
within the scope of recovery. Recovery was allowed for mental
suffering in a case where two school officials attempted to ex-
tract a confession of unchastity from a school girl by threatening
to send her to a reformatory; 25 where a grocery boy delivered
21a Haight v. McEwen, 251 N.Y.S. 2d 839 (1964). Actionable if injury is
foreseeable: Slaughter v. Slaughter, 143 S.E. 2d 683 (N.C. 1965). Actionable
if physical illness results: Falzone v. Busch, N. J. Supr. Ct., Oct. 25, 1965;
reported in N. Y. Times, p. 47 (Oct. 26, 1965). Actionable if wilful: Barry
v. Baugh, 143 S.E. 2d 849 (Ga. 1965).
22 Prosser, Law of Torts, 38-47 (2d ed. 1955).
23 For a brief analysis of the current law, see Editor's Note, 25 NACCA
L. J. 116-129 (1960); Prosser, op. cit. supra, n. 22.
24 Restatement (Second), Law of Torts, Sec. 46 (G) (1948).
25 Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926).
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a package containing a dead rat as a substitute for a loaf of
bread; 26 when a California association of rubbish collectors
threatened to beat a man, destroy his truck, and put him out of
business unless he paid them off with proceeds from a territory
assigned to one of its members; 27 where practical jokers humili-
ated an old lady who had been told to look for a pot of gold by
her fortune teller, by planting a phony pot of gold in her yard,
which she dug up and took to her bank where she opened it pub-
licly to her humiliation; 28 for an unauthorized autopsy on a dead
body;29 when a private investigator attempted to coerce a servant
into getting him letters in her mistress's possession by accusing
her of being a spy and threatening to have her jailed; 30 and
where there has been a threat of pecuniary injury.31 These cases
generally involve mental distress which results in injury to the
body, usually in the form of nervousness, stomach upset, or other
demonstrable physical manifestations of mental anguish. They
meet the test of severity. The courts were satisfied that the in-
juries were not feigned.
The rule that mental suffering must be extreme is not with-
out its exceptions. There is a class of conduct considered by the
society to be so outrageous as to warrant an award for humilia-
tion, indignity, and mental suffering when it is not followed by
physical injury. This class includes wrongful eviction,32 insult
by public carriers3 3 and innkeepers,3 4 and abuse of dead bod-
ies. 35 These cases are particularly interesting in a discussion of
racial discrimination because rejection by reason of race seldom
causes the kind of mental suffering that results in physical ill-
ness. In a study of discrimination in places of public accommo-
dation, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission reports that out of 47
26 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931).
27 State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P. 2d 282
(1952).
28 Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
29 Brown v. Broome County, 10 A.D. 2d 152, 197 N.Y.S. 2d 679 (1960).
30 Janvier v. Sweeney, 2 K. B. 316 (C.A. 1919).
31 Chamberlain v. Chandler, 5 Fed. Cas. 413 (No. 2,575) (C.C. Mass. 1823);
Bleecker v. Colo. & So. Ry. Co., 50 Colo. 140, 114 P. 481 (1911).
32 Curnett v. Wolf, 244 Ia. 683, 57 N.W. 2d 915 (1953).
33 Chamberlain v. Chandler, supra, n. 31; Knoxville Traction Co. v. Lane,
103 Tenn. 376, 53 S.W. 557 (1899).
34 Emmke v. DeSilva, 293 F. 17 (8th Cir. 1923).
35 England v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 86 W.Va. 575, 104 S.E. 46 (1920).
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types of accommodations investigated, only bars were found to be
grossly antagonistic toward Negroes.3 Conduct of personnel in
other accommodations ranges from varying degrees of welcome
through restrained acceptance to total denial. Denial is seldom
accompanied by overt hostility or abusive language and conduct.
Conduct of discriminators was discussed in Holland v. Edwards
(also sub. nom. State Commission Against Discrimination v. Hol-
land) .37 Judge Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals said:
One intent on violating the law against discrimination can-
not be expected to declare or announce his purpose. Far
more likely is it that he will pursue his discriminatory prac-
tice in ways that are devious, by methods subtle and elusive
S.. for we deal with an area in which subtleties of conduct
•.. play no small part.
The Court also said that:
Racial prejudice or discrimination is intangible and elusive
and can be established only through inferences .... It is sub-
stantially subjective in character, with its roots and symp-
toms buried within the recesses of the heart and mind. One
who indulges in discrimination does not shout it from house
tops. In fact, he conceals his true feelings by publicly an-
nouncing contrary views. For this reason, in this type of pro-
ceedings, greater latitude is accorded the tribunal to draw
inferences from words or deeds than in cases where overt
acts need to be established.
The Holland case not only highlights the necessity for rely-
ing on circumstantial evidence to prove racial discrimination, it
also recognizes that an act of discrimination is seldom committed
in an environment of hostility. Rather, it is often subtle. Some-
times rejection is accompanied by an apology or excuse, and a
disclaimer of prejudice. An owner will often say that if it were
up to him, everyone would be served, but since he depends on
white people for his livelihood, he has to discriminate against
Negroes to please his trade. Other instances include the ignoring
of a Negro patron by a waitress; a simple, "I'm sorry, we're not
hiring today," or "I can't cut your hair. I don't know how." 38
36 Discrimination in Places of Public Accommodations in Ohio (A Report
of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, Dec. 1960), pp. 21-26.
37 Holland v. Edwards, also sub. nomine, State Commission Against Dis-
crimination v. Holland, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E. 2d 581 (1954).
38 The excuse given by a barber found to be discriminatory, in Gegner v.
Graham, 1 Ohio App. 2d 442, 205 N.E. 2d 69 (1964); dismissed as moot, 1
Ohio St. 2d 108, 205 N.E. 2d 72 (1965).
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Usually it is conduct that does not arouse the spirit to the
extent of a headache, upset stomach, fainting spell or other
physical result of either momentary or lasting duration. This is
not to say that hostile confrontations between civil rights work-
ers and Negroes on the one hand and segregationists and dis-
criminatory proprietors on the other do not cause emotional dis-
tress which results in physical harm. There are many such in-
stances reported in the news media, but they are not the daily
experience of most Negroes. For the most part, these confronta-
tions are planned by civil rights organizations. Resistance is ex-
pected and prepared for. They cannot be considered typical. Nor
does it deny that a sign which reads "Colored Not Served"
arouses anger in some black and white men alike. It merely sug-
gests that a singular act of racial discrimination does not usually
cause the extreme mental suffering anticipated by the general
rules regarding damages.
Racial discrimination cases best fit within the exception
allowed for those cases where malice or complete disregard for
the sensibilities of the victim support an award for mental
anguish.39
A striking similarity exists between the wrongful eviction
and the public accommodations cases. Landlords have been held
liable for damages when they wrongfully evict a tenant causing
mental anguish and humiliation without physical harm.40 Malice
or a reckless disregard for the sensibilities of the tenant appear
to be necessary to support an award. On this basis, a Utah
court 41 has allowed recovery where a plaintiff was wrongfully
evicted from her leased premises. The plaintiff went away for
a holiday. When she returned, she found strangers occupying her
apartment. The court held that in assessing damages for wrong-
ful eviction, mental anguish and suffering, injury to pride and
social position, and a sense of shame and humiliation caused by
the landlord's conduct are elements to be considered, and that a
tenant may recover damages for injury to her dignity, and in-
sult caused by being turned out of her home with her family.
The kind of mental suffering experienced by the evicted ten-
ant in the Utah case seems no less difficult to assess than that
39 For a complete discussion of the legal basis for awards for mental suffer-
ing in the absence of physical injury see Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 Cal.
L. Rev. 40 (1956).
40 See Annotation, Eviction-Injury to Tenant, 17 A.L.R. 2d 936.
41 Hargrave v. Leigh, 73 Utah 178, 273 P. 298 (1928).
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experienced by a Negro who is evicted from or refused admission
to a place of public accommodations. Similarly, injury to a Ne-
gro's sensibilities, pride, and self-esteem is as likely to result
from his publicly being turned away from a restaurant, theatre,
hotel, or other accommodation as that experienced by one who
is wrongfully evicted. Both wrongful eviction and unlawful dis-
crimination are intentional acts which inflict harm. The basis for
an award of compensatory damages is the same for one as for the
other. As a practical matter, the difference between the two rests
primarily with possible difference in the degree of outrage at-
tached to each by the community in which the act occurred.
In the absence of a legislative statement of public policy
which forbids or condemns discrimination, community outrage
appears to be the test of whether an act of racial discrimination
falls within that class of cases for which damages for insult, hu-
miliation, or mental anguish apart from resultant physical harm
will be allowed. Undoubtedly, whether a discrimination claim
meets this test will vary from one community to another. Cer-
tainly where discrimination is customary and traditional, it is not
likely to shock either the white majority or the Negro minority,
irrespective of the harm it does to the individual. But where the
legislature recognizes the outrage by statute, the courts need not
go further than that statute to determine whether an action can
be maintained. Actual community outrage, then, will be reflected
in the values the juries place on the injury and the amount of
the awards. If courts rely on federal anti-discrimination pro-
nouncements to support such actions in states where there are no
local statutes, and the attitudes of the people are contrary to the
federal law, these attitudes will be reflected in low dollar awards
or no awards at all. The adequacy of the compensation, as in all
law suits, depends upon community attitudes toward the cause
of action, and the value of injuries.
Certain discriminatory acts will be considered more out-
rageous than others. Discrimination by ambulance services, hos-
pitals, and the medical profession could arouse a deep sense of
outrage in the public. Take an example. A California medical
doctor refused to treat a Negro child solely because of her race.
The child's father brought an action for damages on behalf of
himself and the child under the Unruh Act. He contended that
the doctor breached an agreement with him to treat his daughter.
He further alleged that a doctor comes within the proscription of
the law prohibiting racial discrimination. California's highest
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1966
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court rejected the doctor's argument that his services are per-
sonal in nature and that he cannot be held liable for refusing to
serve someone because of race.42 For our purposes, this case is
of interest for two reasons. First, because of the traditional atti-
tudes of the public toward health, life, and the medical profes-
sion's commitment to help the sick, one might well shout, "Out-
rageous!" 43 upon hearing of a doctor's refusal to treat the child.
And second, mental anguish could be an element of damages it-
self or in addition to any physical harm suffered by the child as
a result of the doctor's refusal to treat her.
Courts have allowed damages for mishandling of dead bod-
ies. Mutilation,44 disinterment, 45 interference with burial,46 and
other intentional disturbances have been the basis for an award.
While a property right of the next of kin in the dead body has
been discussed in the decisions, it is obvious that the personal
feelings of the survivors are the object of the courts' protection.47
An analogous civil rights case involved an Akron, Ohio, Negro
who sought to bury her deceased grandmother in a local ceme-
tery.48 Mrs. Smith received a solicitation letter from Rose Hill
Burial Park suggesting that she contemplate the time when her
husband or other relative might be in need of its services. Not
long after she received the letter, her grandmother died. Mrs.
Smith asked the undertaker to make arrangements for burial at
Rose Hill. When the undertaker called the cemetery's business
office, apparently the manager recognized his name as being that
of a Negro funeral director. He was told that Rose Hill did not
accept Negroes for burial. Mrs. Smith filed a complaint with the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission claiming that Rose Hill was a
place of public accommodation and that she had been refused the
equal enjoyment, services and privileges thereof by reason of
race, contrary to the Ohio Civil Rights Act. Counsel for the
Commission advised the complainant temporarily to deposit her
42 Washington v. A. Blampin, 38 Cal. Rptr. 235 (Dist. Ct. App., 1964).
48 See n. 24, supra.
44 Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891); Cremouese v. City of
N.Y., 259 N. Y. S. 2d 235 (1965).
45 Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of Sacred Heart, 262 N.Y. 320, 186
N.E. 798 (1933).
46 Speigel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 N.J.L. 90, 186 A. 585 (1936).
47 Prosser, Law of Torts, 50, 349 (3rd ed. 1964).
48 In re: Rose Hill Securities Co., d.b.a. Rose Hill Burial Park (Ohio Civil
Rights Com., 1963), 8 Race Rel. L. Rep. 749 (1964).
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grandmother's body in a mausoleum crypt pending the outcome
of litigation so as to prevent mootness. The cemetery defended
itself before the Commission on the ground that it was not a
place of public accommodation, restrictive covenants with other
plot owners prevented it from receiving Negroes for burial, and
that it was not discriminatory because a section of the cemetery
was set aside for Jewish dead under an agreement with a Jewish
congregation. The Commission's Hearing Examiner decided the
case on an agreed set of facts and on arguments of law. On his
recommendation, the Commission ordered Rose Hill to bury the
body and pay Mrs. Smith the tomb rental fee. The cemetery
complied without court contest, and buried the body. No com-
pensation was awarded for Mrs. Smith's humiliation, grief, or
anxiety. Indeed, the statute makes no mention of compensation
for such injuries.
If one accepts Commissioner Hersberg's concurring state-
ment attached to the 1960 Report to the President by the United
States Civil Rights Commission,49 in which he said that he does
not care if we ever get to the moon so long as even at death,
Negro Americans cannot rest side by side with other Americans,
as representative of a sense of outrage experienced by many
Americans because of the "cradle to grave" discrimination suf-
fered by Negroes, it is not difficult to conclude that facts similar
to the Rose Hill case can support an action for damages due to
mental anguish. A similar Iowa case so aroused public sentiment
that the legislature amended the statute to include cemeteries
before the case was reached for final decision by the United
States Supreme Court.50 There is no substantial distinction be-
tween the discriminatory burial cases and a case where crema-
tion was refused because of previous unpaid funeral bills, and
a damage award was allowed for mental anguish suffered by a
relative.51
Common carriers have been held liable for insulting pas-
sengers. Cases have held that the carrier is liable for language
which is merely profane, indecent, or insulting to people of ordi-
nary sensibilities even though the insult or other mental disturb-
49 50 States Report, a Report to the President by the United States Civil
Rights Commission (1960).
50 Rice vs. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 60 N.W. 2d 110 (Iowa,
1953) aff'd; 348 U.S. 880 (1954), pet. for rehearing gntd, jmt. and cert. dis'd,
349 U.S. 70 (1955).
51 Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133 Wash. 134, 233 P. 299 (1925).
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ance was not accompanied by physical illness. 52 Some decisions
rest on the theory that the carrier has a special obligation to the
public to be decent.53 Similar liability has been imposed on inn-
keepers,5 4 owners of theaters,55 amusement parks,56 and other
places of amusement. There is no reason why the same result
might not be reached in a case where the complainant has been
denied access to a place of public accommodation because of his
race in violation of a statute.
In discussing the possible amount of recovery, the court in
the Amos case 57 recognized the injury we are considering here:
If the defendant's description of the cause of plaintiff's emo-
tional distress, deprivation of an evening's dancing, were
accepted this contention might have merit .... The plaintiff
complains not merely of the deprivation of an evening's
pleasure on the dance floor but of the emotional distress
caused by defendant's public and illegal act of discrimina-
tion against her on account of her race.
58
And further:
When the act is intentional or willful, however, compensa-
tory damages may be recovered for emotional distress un-
accompanied by any physical injury.59
Judicial recognition of the idea that damages are recover-
able for mental suffering caused by the intentional conduct of
one who acts with malice or complete disregard for the sensibil-
ities of another, provides a firm basis for similar recovery by per-
sons who are victims of unlawful discrimination. Expansion of
the scope of existing liability to include those who violate anti-
discrimination statutes will serve to recognize a like injury suf-
fered by members of minority races and religions which is the
result of unlawful conduct. Mental suffering caused by those who
unlawfully discriminate against others by reason of race or reli-
gion is an injury similar to that declared compensable in other
cases. Modern courts should not ignore this injury.
52 Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Jones, 39 S.W. 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).
53 Birmingham Ry. L. & P. Co. v. Glenn, 179 Ala. 263; 60 So. 111 (1912);
Cole v. Atlantic & W. P. Ry. Co., 102 Ga. 474, 31 S.E. 107 (1897).
54 Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel, 228 N.Y. 106, 126 N.E. 647 (1920).
55 Saenger Theaters Corp. v. Herndon, 180 Miss. 791; 178 So. 86 (1938).
56 Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 P. 209 (1904).
57 See n. 18, supra.
58 Citing, To Secure These Rights, a Report to the President by the United
States Civil Rights Commission (1947), pp. 76, 77, 82, et seq.
59 Ibid.
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